

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Lord Cromer, British Ambassador to the
United States
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

DATE & TIME: Friday, September 22, 1972
12:03 ~ 12:35 p.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger Office
The White House

At the beginning of the meeting, Dr. Kissinger handed over to Ambassador Cromer the President's letter to Prime Minister Heath [Tab A] thanking him for the courtesies extended to Dr. Kissinger on his recent visit to London.

Dr. Kissinger: Here is the letter. And a copy for you.

Ambassador Cromer: That's very nice.

What I want to talk to you about is entirely on my own initiative. I have absolutely no instructions on this. When the President saw Sir Burke Trend [July 28], it was agreed that if ever anything came up with any political overtones on the money side, we should raise it. I want to mention this Schweitzer business. As you know, Schultz more or less blocked his reappointment. Of course you're quite entitled to do this. Volcker went and told him, and was then spreading the word.

Dr. Kissinger: He ran afoul of Connally.

Ambassador Cromer: And Volcker is continuing this and is being more Connally than Connally.

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2

As I say, you're entitled to take the position you want. I am concerned that the manner in which you went about it may hurt the atmosphere for the reform we want.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought Schultz was going to see him.

Ambassador Cromer: The less developed countries, for example, I'm afraid are now going to portray him as a hero. There will be a lot of speeches at the forthcoming meeting.

There was a "secret" meeting yesterday of the less developed countries -- which I heard about -- in which the delegates here were in fact discussing proposing to their governments that they take this line.

You know I will be seeing Schultz today.

Dr. Kissinger: To see a speech he's giving this week. Yes. Please call me, Rowley, and give me your honest opinion of it. What he is instructed to do is give a general framework, with some specifics, but not on a confrontation basis. We thought that having no American position at all would be even more unsettling.

Ambassador Cromer: Yes. As I say, I'm saying this completely without instructions. Just to warn you about what I think is coming.

Dr. Kissinger: It's perfectly all right. You're not asking us to do anything.

And call me about the speech. I can't stop it but perhaps I can moderate it.

Ambassador Cromer: In London you mentioned to Burke a new formula you had for presentation to the North Vietnamese.

Dr. Kissinger: Here it is. The statement I made and the new formula we presented. [Hands over U.S. proposals and opening statement from September 15 Paris meeting.]

Ambassador Cromer: This is very top secret, of course.

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3

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, because our Secretary of State doesn't even know we made a presentation, let alone what it contains.

Ambassador Cromer: Clive Rose is coming over to talk about SALT with Sonnenfeldt. You said at one point you might see him. Do you want to?

Dr. Kissinger: What do you think? I leave it to you. Sonnenfeldt doesn't admit that when he's through there's any reason for me to do anything.

Ambassador Cromer: Let's do it this way: If anything is unresolved after he meets with Sonnenfeldt, I shall ask for an appointment.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if you request it, I'll do it.

Ambassador Cromer: My Secretary of State is, of course, delighted with the President's kind invitation. He would also like a quiet word with you, perhaps before dinner.

Dr. Kissinger: After dinner might be better.

Ambassador Cromer: He'll be leaving late in the evening.

Dr. Kissinger: Then before dinner is fine. How about 7:30, here?

Ambassador Cromer: Fine.

We have some news on this Uganda business. It's absolute hell.

Dr. Kissinger: As you know, we're moving to take some of your people.

Ambassador Cromer: Yes, that marvelous. The news is that it was deteriorating quite badly yesterday but it is better today. But we'll face the problem of taking care of the British -- the real British. The problem is to get them from the country to the airport.

Dr. Kissinger: What can we do?

Ambassador Cromer: We don't know what to propose!

It was interesting that a Libyan plane carrying arms to Amin tried to overfly the Sudan. The Sudanese forced them to land and took the arms!

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4

They made a very robust statement. This is the first major reverse the Libyans have suffered. It may be the only healthy outcome of this.

Dr. Kissinger: If you have to consider strong measures, you won't get into trouble with us, to put it mildly.

Ambassador Cromer: We're in touch with State on this.

Dr. Kissinger: The President is in a mood to be much tougher than State. He has been thinking of pulling back our Ambassador. What do you think?

Ambassador Cromer: That would be a mistake. We're more evil in their eyes than you are. For you to pull out now would be interpreted by Amin, who is a madman, as part of a conspiracy.

Dr. Kissinger: We will look with favor on anything you have to do. What can we do?

Ambassador Cromer: I don't know. There are eight American Jews there that State is particularly concerned about.

Dr. Kissinger: On these statements, I gave you, there are two things. This is about as far as we are going to go. We may play around with the cosmetics, but it is as far as we can go.

They are exceptionally confidential, I have to repeat. We haven't given this to anyone else. If the North Vietnamese ever found out we gave this to you

My impression of the North Vietnamese is that they are eager to settle and afraid to settle at the same time. They are eager to settle but don't know how to do it. They are clumsy.

[At this point the meeting ended.]

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